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Abstract: Oil price shocks are thought to have played a prominent role in U.S. economic 
activity. In this paper, we employ Bayesian methods with a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model of world economic activity to identify the various sources of oil price shocks 
and economic fluctuation and to assess their effects on U.S. economic activity. We find that 
changes in oil prices are best understood as endogenous. Oil price shocks in the 1970s and early 
1980s and the 2000s reflect differing mixes of shifts in oil supply and demand, and differing 
sources of oil price shocks have differing effects on economic activity. We also find that U.S. 
output fluctuations owe mostly to domestic shocks, with productivity shocks contributing to 
weakness in the 1970s and 1980s and strength in the 2000s. 
 
JEL Codes: C3, E3, Q43 
 
Keywords: oil price; international business cycles; general equilibrium; Bayesian estimation 
 
                                                             
* Nathan S. Balke is Dedman Family Distinguished Professor at Southern Methodist University and research 
associate at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. Stephen P.A. Brown is a nonresident fellow at Resources for the 
Future. Mine K. Yücel is vice president and senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. The authors 
thank Roger Cooke, Mario Crucini, Fred Joutz, Luca Guerrieri, William Helkie, Lutz Kilian, Prakash Loungani, 
Erwan Quintin, Tara Sinclair, Mark Wynne, and Carlos Zarazaga for helpful comments and discussions and Stefan 
Avdjiev, Xin Jin, and Zheng Zeng for capable research assistance. The authors retain all responsibility for omissions 
and errors. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas, the Federal Reserve System, Resources for the Future, or Southern Methodist University. 
     1 
1. Introduction 
Economic research has long focused on the aggregate economic effects of unfavorable oil 
supply shocks. Some of the earlier studies examining oil price shocks include Rasche and Tatom 
(1977), Mork and Hall (1980), Hamilton (1983), and the Energy Modeling Forum 7 study 
documented by Hickman et al. (1987). As reported in surveys by Brown and Yücel (2002), Jones 
et al, (2004), and Kilian (2008c), the literature finds such consequences as rising oil prices, 
slower GDP growth and possible recession, higher unemployment rates, and higher price levels.  
As oil prices rose sharply in the 2000s, however, the gains in oil prices seemed to be 
positively related to economic growth. The apparent weakening or reversal of the past economic 
effects of oil price shocks stimulated a new literature about why the U.S. economy might 
respond differently to rising oil prices in the 2000s than it did in the 1970s and early 80s. The 
explanations include increased global financial integration, greater flexibility of the U.S. 
economy (including labor and financial markets), the reduced energy intensity of the U.S. 
economy, increased experience with energy price shocks, better monetary policy, and good 
luck—that is, smaller and less frequent shocks. Contributions include Huntington (2003), Stock 
and Watson (2003), Congressional Budget Office (2006), Blanchard and Gali (2007), Edelstein 
and Kilian (2007), Segal (2007), and Herrera and Pesavento (2009), who mostly treat oil price 
shocks as exogenous. 
In contrast, an emerging literature explores the implications of treating oil price shocks as 
endogenous with sources that could include demand as well as supply, including Barsky and 
Kilian (2002, 2004), Bodenstein et al. (2007), Nakov and Pescatori (2007a, 2007b) and Kilian 
(2008a, 2008b, 2009). The differing sources of oil price shocks can explain the apparent 
instability of the relationship between oil prices and aggregate economic activity.      2 
Kilian (2008b) maintains that most of the oil price gains after 1970 were the result of 
demand shocks; only the recession of 1980–1982 was the result of exogenous oil supply shocks; 
and exogenous supply shocks explain only a small fraction of the oil price increases during the 
1973–1974, 1990–1991, and 2002–2003 episodes. Kilian (2009) identifies oil price shocks as 
variously arising from shocks to crude oil supply, global demand, and precautionary demand and 
then uses a vector autoregressive model to show that the different sources of shocks have 
substantially differential effects on U.S. GDP and consumer prices.  
In the present analysis, we attempt to identify the sources and consequences of oil price 
fluctuations on economic activity. Instead of using a reduced-form vector autoregressive model, 
we use a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of world economic activity. The 
model provides a mapping from “structural shocks” in technology and preferences to observables 
such as oil prices, oil output, and other measures of economic activity. Our model is similar to 
that of Backus and Crucini (2000) in that the world economy is represented as two 
manufacturing countries and an oil-producing country. The model includes many features in the 
recent DSGE literature, such as the inclusion of oil in consumption (Bodenstein et al. 2007) and 
a general specification of preferences (Jaimovich and Rebelo 2009). 
Our model departs from the previous literature by treating oil supply decisions in an 
optimizing framework. Oil producers face an intertemporal trade-off when deciding how much 
oil to produce: higher production today reduces the oil reserves available in the future. Oil 
producers can also invest to expand oil reserves, which increases future oil production capacity. 
Thus, the evolution of reserves and production are choice variables for producers.  
Rather than calibrate the parameters of the model and use it for a simulation exercise, we 
use Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of technology and preferences as well as the     3 
parameters for the stochastic process generating the exogenous shocks. In estimating the 
parameters, we also estimate realizations for the unobserved shock processes. The latter allows 
us to identify and differentiate oil supply and demand shocks. In particular, the model allows us 
to estimate the effects of various types of shocks on oil markets and aggregate economic activity. 
These shocks include those to oil production and oil reserves in the oil-producing countries, and 
total factor productivity, preferences between goods and leisure, investment efficiency, and oil 
efficiency in the manufacturing countries. 
Over the 1970–2009 period for which the model is estimated, historical decompositions 
suggest that nearly all the fluctuations in oil prices and oil output are due to oil-specific shocks—
either oil supply shocks originating in the oil-producing country or oil efficiency shocks 
originating in the manufacturing countries. We find oil supply shocks contributed to long swings 
in oil prices and oil output, while oil efficiency shocks contributed much of the higher frequency 
movements in oil prices and oil output. Nonetheless, these oil-specific shocks had only mild 
effects on the growth of U.S. real GDP.  
U.S. economic fluctuations are estimated to be due largely to domestic shocks in total 
factor productivity, preferences for goods versus leisure, and investment. The episodes of poor 
U.S. economic performance during our 1970–2009 estimation period appear to be mostly the 
result of negative shocks to total factor productivity and labor supply. Some episodes of weak 
economic activity were coincident with sharply rising oil prices, and in some cases, unfavorable 
oil supply shocks contributed to a slight drag on U.S. economic activity 
2. The Model 
We approach identification of the source of oil price fluctuations through the lens of a 
three-country DSGE model. The model combines elements from the open economy model of     4 
Backus and Crucini (2000) with oil market features in Bodenstein et al. (2007) and the recent 
generalization of preferences proposed by Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009). Two countries each 
produce a final manufactured good. The third country produces oil, which is both a consumption 
good and an intermediate good used in the production of the manufactured goods.  
Departing from Backus and Crucini, we treat oil production and the evolution of oil 
reserves in the oil-producing country as completely endogenous.
1 This treatment of oil 
production and pricing allows us to consider the role that shocks originating in the two 
manufacturing countries can have in generating oil price fluctuations. By modeling the evolution 
of oil reserves, we introduce an intertemporal channel through which oil markets can be affected 
and expectations about future oil prices can have a direct effect on current oil prices.  
2.1 Consumers 
  In each of the three countries, consumers directly use the two manufactured goods and 
face a labor–leisure trade-off. Accordingly, consumers in each country j maximize lifetime 
utility: 
€ 
β
tU(C j,t,N j,t)
t=0
∞
∑        for j = a, b, o,           (1) 
where β is a discount factor,   is the consumption of the representative agent in country j, and 
€ 
N j,t is hours worked. We adopt the preference specification proposed by Jaimovich and Rebelo 
(2009): 
€ 
U(C j,t,L j,t) =
(C j,t − χN j,t
η X j,tZ j,t
U )
1−σ
1−σ
 ,        (2) 
                                                             
1 Backus and Crucini (2000) represent oil production as having an exogenous component (Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries) and an endogenous supply component via a labor-only technology.      5 
where 
€ 
X j,t = C j,t
γ X j,t−1
1−γ ,   reflects a time varying disutility of work that depends on past 
consumption choices,   is a exogenous preference shock, and γ determines the strength of the 
wealth effect on the supply of labor. As in Jaimovich and Rebelo, Equation 2 embeds two classes 
of utility functions widely used in the literature. If γ=1, we have the standard set of preferences 
as in King et al. (1988). If γ=0, preferences are as in Greenwood et al. (1988), and there is no 
wealth effect on the supply of labor. 
To assess the effect of oil price fluctuations on consumption, we utilize a consumption 
function that is a CES aggregate of manufactured goods and oil usage as in Bodenstein et al. 
(2007), 
€ 
C j,t =[ωG
cGc, j,t
1−µc + (1−ωG
c)Z j,t
E Oc, j,t
1−µc]
1/(1−µc )   for j = a, b, o,           (3) 
where Gc,j,t is country j’s use of manufactured goods and Oc,j,t is the country j’s use of oil for 
consumption,   captures the weight households place on the consumption of goods relative to 
oil,   is the elasticity of substitution between goods and oil in consumption, and   is a 
exogenous shock that affects the relative efficiency of oil usage and is common to both 
production and consumption.
2 This specification captures the reality that oil is used in the 
consumer sector and is in line with Edelstein and Kilian (2007), who show that consumer 
spending on energy is a major transmission mechanism of oil price shocks.  
Manufactured goods are themselves a composite of domestic and foreign produced 
goods: 
€ 
Gc, j,t =[ωA, j
g,cAc, j,t
1−µg + (1−ωA, j
g,c)Bc, j,t
1−µg]
1/(1−µg )
 ,      (4) 
                                                             
2 For the oil-producing country, we drop 
€ 
Z j,t
U , 
€ 
Z j,t
E from preferences because we lack the detailed data with which to 
separately identify such shocks.     6 
where 
€ 
ωA, j
g,c
 is the weight that good A (produced by country a) receives in country j’s composite 
consumption good. Assuming home bias, 
€ 
ωA,a
g,c >1−ωA,a
g,c and 
€ 
1−ωA,b
g,c >ωA,b
g,c, and symmetry, 
€ 
ωA,a
g,c = (1−ωA,b
g,c). 
2.2 Manufacturing, Production, and Investment 
  In each manufacturing country, output is a function of capital, labor, oil use, and the 
technology available in each time period: 
€ 
Yj,t = Z j,t
Y N j,t
α (ωK
yK j,t
1−υ + (1−ωK
y )Z j,t
E OY, j,t
1−υ )
1−α
1−υ       for j = a, b,           (5) 
where Yj,t is country j output at time t, Kj,t is capital, Nj,t is labor, 
€ 
OY, j,t is oil use,   is total 
factor productivity, and   is an oil efficiency shock.
3 With this function, oil and capital are 
used to produce capital services, which are combined with labor to produce goods. The elasticity 
of substitution between capital and oil in the production of capital services is given by 
€ 
1/ν and 
will generally be different than that between capital services and labor (which is unitary, given 
the Cobb-Douglas representation of the latter relationship). 
Similar to that for consumption, the CES investment aggregate for each manufacturing 
country is as follows: 
€ 
I j,t = Z j,t
I [ωA, j
g AI, j,t
1−µg + (1−ωA, j
g )BI, j,t
1−µg]
1/(1−µg)   for j = a, b,           (6) 
where 
€ 
AI, j,t is country j’s use of good A for investment, 
€ 
BI, j,t is the country j’s use of good B for 
investment, and  an investment efficiency shock. Capital accumulation in each manufacturing 
country takes into account depreciation and investment as follows: 
                                                             
3 As in Backus and Crucini (2000), we allow total factor productivity to be correlated across manufacturing 
countries, both contemporaneously and with a lagged spillover, but the stochastic processes are not the same across 
the two countries. We assume that the (logs) of the other exogenous driving forces follow independent first-order 
autoregressive processes. 
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€ 
K j,t+1 = (1−δ)K j,t + Φ(I j,t /K j,t)K j,t       for j = a, b,          (7) 
where δ is the depreciation rate, Ij,t is investment, and 
€ 
Φ(I j,t /K j,t) is the rate at which investment 
goods become capital. The latter expression reflects adjustment costs in changing the stock of 
capital with 
€ 
′  Φ (.) > 0 and 
€ 
′  ′  Φ (.) < 0. 
2.3 Oil Production and Reserves 
  The production of oil is a function of oil reserves, labor, and the technology available in 
each time period: 
€ 
Yo,t = Zo,t
y (ωX
y Xt
1−ρo + (1−ωX
y )No,t
1−ρo)
1
1−ρo  ,         (8) 
where Yo,t is oil production at time t, Xt is oil reserves, No,t is the labor used in oil extraction, and 
is the oil production technology. Note that in time period t, Xt is predetermined. 
The evolution of oil reserves reflects both additions to reserves and the depletion due to 
production:  
€ 
Xt+1 = Xt + Gt −Yo,t .              (9) 
Gross additions to reserves, Gt are:  
€ 
Gt = Φg(Ix,t /Xt)Xt ,             (10) 
where Ix,t is the investment in the production of reserves.  
€ 
Io,t = Zo,t
I (ωA,o
g AI,o,t
1−µg + (1−ωA,o
g )BI,o,t
1−µg)
1/(1−µg) ,       (11) 
where  is a technology shock to the production of reserves. Here we assume symmetry with 
respect to the weight the oil-producing country places on goods A and B; 
€ 
ωA,o
g = (1−ωA,o
g ) = 0.5. 
Additions to reserves reflect an adjustment-cost mechanism similar to that employed by capital, 
where 
€ 
Φg'(.) > 0 and 
€ 
Φg"(.) < 0. Note that in steady state, 
€ 
Φg(I/X) =Yo /X , and 
€ 
Φg'(I/X) =1. 
One can view reserves in our model as representing total capital in the oil-producing sector,     8 
which reflects oil production infrastructure (capital) as well as oil in the ground. The depletion of 
reserves (i.e., the depreciation of oil-producing capital) depends on how much oil is produced.  
Maximizing the representative agent’s utility in the oil-producing country and taking 
prices as given yields the decisions rules for the production of oil and reserves. Oil production is 
determined so that: 
€ 
po,t = px,t + mco,t ,          (12) 
where   is the price of oil,   is the price of reserves (user cost of oil), and 
€ 
mco,t is the 
marginal cost of producing oil in time period t.
4 Given that the stock of reserves is fixed in time 
t, 
€ 
mco,t = wo,t /mpl,t
o , where 
€ 
wo,t is the wage in the oil-producing country and 
€ 
mpl,t
o  is the marginal 
product of labor in the oil-producing country.  
The presence of reserves introduces an intertemporal element to the oil producers supply 
decision. The first-order condition for the production of reserves is given by:  
€ 
px,t = E
t [Mt+1{(po,t+1 − px,t+1)mpx,t+1
o + px,t+1(1+ Φg,t+1 − ′  Φ  g,t+1
Ix,t+1
Xt+1
)}],    (13) 
where 
€ 
Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor and 
€ 
{(po,t+1 − px,t+1)mpx,t+1
o + px,t+1(1+ Φg,t+1 − ′  Φ  g,t+1
Ix,t+1
Xt+1
)} is the payoff of having more reserves next 
period. Thus, expectations of future oil market conditions have a direct effect on current oil 
production decision through the interplay of equations (12) and (13). 
                                                             
4 Modeling the oil-producing country as a price-taker is contrary to the view that OPEC restricts production or sets 
oil prices. As long as price is a constant mark-up over costs, however, such an assumption will not have an 
appreciable effect on our analysis. Fluctuations in the price of reserves will reflect any fluctuations in the mark-up of 
oil prices over marginal costs. Thus, changes in OPEC’s price-setting stance will in part be captured by our 
measures of technology shocks to oil production and reserve development.  
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  For a given level of inputs, a negative technology shock to oil production,  , will lower 
the production of oil and increase marginal costs—lowering output and raising the price. To the 
extent that the shock is persistent, it will result in higher prices for reserves both currently and in 
the future, stimulating the development of reserves in the future. These reserve additions enable 
higher oil production in the future.  
Although a technology shock to the development of reserves,  , has no direct effect on 
contemporaneous oil supply (recall that   is predetermined in time period t), it can affect 
current oil prices and oil output. For instance, a negative shock to the development of reserves 
will mean fewer reserves in the future, which will reduce future oil production and raise future 
oil prices. Taken alone, this shock would boost the price of reserves and, hence, result in a 
reduction of current oil output and an increase in current oil prices.  
2.4 International Market Clearing Constraints 
  In each time period, market clearing for each of the three goods implies: 
€ 
ψaYa,t =ψa(AC,a,t + AI,a,t)+ψb(AC,b,t + AI,b,t)+ψo(AC,o,t + AI,o,t),    (14) 
€ 
ψbYb,t =ψa(BC,a,t + BI,a,t)+ψb(BC,b,t + BI,b,t)+ψo(BC,o,t + BI,o,t), and   (15) 
€ 
ψoYo,t =ψa(OC,a,t + OY,a,t)+ψb(OC,b,t + OY,b,t)+ψo(Oc,o,t),      (16) 
where  ,  , and   reflect the relative sizes of three countries. We also assume complete asset 
markets internationally, which allows for perfect risk sharing across countries. 
3. Model Estimation 
To solve the model for a given set of parameters, we log-linearize the first-order 
conditions of the social planner’s problem around the deterministic steady state and solve the 
resulting linear rational expectations model as in Blanchard and Kahn (1980). Rather than     10 
calibrate the parameters, we use Bayesian methods to estimate the parameters of technology, 
preferences, and the stochastic processes generating the exogenous shocks.  
We take the United States to be one of the manufacturing countries in the model. We take 
the other manufacturing country, denoted below as “ROW,” to be the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development countries (excluding the Czech Republic, Mexico, Slovakia, and 
the United States) plus Brazil, China, and India. We set the relative size of the United States at 
=0.25 and ROW at  =0.65. We include eight quarterly time series in the estimation of the 
model. These include real oil prices (deflated by the U.S. GDP deflator), world oil production, 
U.S. real GDP, U.S. real consumption, U.S. real investment, U.S. hours worked, U.S. oil 
consumption, and the relative price of imports to the United States. 
 Although the relative price of U.S. imports, U.S. oil consumption, and world oil 
production provide some information about economic activity in the ROW, it would be useful to 
include more direct information. Unfortunately, quarterly data of sufficient length are not 
available for many countries we include in ROW. Because our estimation procedure readily 
handles the use of mixed frequency data, however, we add annual ROW output and investment 
(in constant dollars) as two additional observation equations. Thus, taken together, we have eight 
quarterly observation equations and two annual observation equations. Our sample period runs 
from first quarter 1970 through third quarter 2009 for quarterly data and from 1970 through 2008 
for annual data.  
The linearized DSGE model links the observed time series and the underlying driving 
processes that result in deviations from the steady state.
5 Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods 
similar to those of Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) and Smets and Wouters (2007) are employed to 
                                                             
5 The logs of U.S. real GDP, consumption, investment, hours, oil consumption; relative price of imports to the 
United States; ROW output and investment; and world oil production are linearly detrended. The logs of real oil 
price are demeaned.     11 
estimate the posterior distribution of the parameters.
6 In estimating the posterior distribution of 
the parameters, we also estimate a posterior distribution for the unobserved shock processes. 
These estimates allow us to decompose movements in actual observables into contributions due 
to various exogenous shocks. 
3.1 Prior and Posterior Distributions of the Structural Parameters 
In implementing the Bayesian estimation strategy, we specify prior distributions for the 
structural parameters and the parameters of the stochastic processes of the ten exogenous driving 
forces. For most of the structural parameters for the two manufacturing countries, we set the 
mode of the prior distribution to be similar to those set in Backus and Crucini (2000) or in 
Bodenstein et al. (2007). For the oil-producing country, we use information on the ratio of oil 
production to reserves,
 
; labor share in the production of oil; and the ratio of oil price to 
reserve price, 
€ 
po
px
=
po
p0 − mc0
, to help set the prior distributions of the parameters. For the 
elasticities of substitution between home and foreign-produced manufacturing; elasticities of 
substitution between oil and manufacturing goods (or capital); and the shares of oil, domestic 
goods, and foreign goods, we set the mode of prior distribution equal to values in Backus and 
Crucini or Bodenstein et al. 
As for how much weight to place on the prior distribution versus the data when 
estimating the posterior distributions, we divide the parameters into three groups. Parameters like 
the discount factor or those that reflect shares of steady-state values (such as output elasticity of 
labor equals labor’s share in GDP) have relatively tight priors. Parameters that reflect elasticities 
of substitution or adjustment costs for capital and reserves have more diffuse priors. Finally, a 
                                                             
6 See Section B of the Technical Appendix for the details of the Markov Chain Monte Carlo approach taken in the 
current paper.     12 
third group of parameters—the parameters of the stochastic processes governing the driving 
forces—have relatively uninformed priors, as we have very little direct prior information 
concerning these stochastic processes.  
Table 1 displays the prior and estimated posterior distributions of the structural 
parameters. For many parameters, using the information in the data results in a substantial shift 
in the posterior distribution relative to the prior distribution; for most parameters the posterior 
distribution is substantially tighter than the prior distribution. Not surprisingly given the tight 
priors for these parameters, the posterior distributions for the discount factor, labor’s share in 
manufacturing-country GDP, the share of home and foreign goods, oil’s share in production, and 
the depreciation rate on capital are similar to the prior distributions of those parameters. One 
exception is the posterior distribution for the share of oil in consumption; it shifts toward lower 
values compared with the prior distribution (interior 90 percent of [.0085, .0113] for the posterior 
distribution versus [.034, .047] for the prior distribution). 
Our posterior distribution suggests an estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution that is similar to that typically assumed in the macroeconomics literature. Similarly, 
the posterior distribution of the elasticity of substitution between capital and oil is centered 
around a value similar to that assumed by Backus and Crucini. On the other hand, the posterior 
distribution also suggests an elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods that is 
substantially lower than that typically assumed in open-economy DSGE models.
7 Note that the 
posterior distributions for most of these elasticities are substantially “tighter” than their prior 
distributions. Finally, the adjustment costs for capital are estimated to be substantially higher 
                                                             
7 The dramatic swings in the relative import price over our sample period likely contribute to a relatively low value 
for the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.      13 
than those for oil reserves, suggesting that it is easier to add to reserves than it is to add to capital 
in the manufacturing country.  
A key parameter in the utility function is γ. We employed a flat prior distribution 
centered around 0.5 for this parameter, but the posterior distribution is substantially tighter and 
centered around 0.75. This suggests that the utility function for our representative agent is closer 
to the standard King et al. (1988) preferences than to the Greenwood et al. (1988) preferences. 
This estimated value has implications for the response of U.S. (and ROW) GDP to an oil 
production shock. 
Table 2 presents the prior and posterior distributions for the stochastic processes 
governing the exogenous variables in the model. Given that prior distributions were relatively 
uninformative, the data have much to say about these parameters. The autoregressive parameters 
are quite high, suggesting that shocks are very persistent. The standard deviation of shocks to oil 
production and oil reserves is relatively large compared to shocks in total factor productivity and 
investment shocks in the manufacturing countries. The standard deviation of the oil efficiency 
shocks in the two manufacturing countries is very large, suggesting that these two variables may 
be an important source of shocks to world oil demand. On the other hand, the estimated spillover 
in total productivity is relatively small. 
4. Estimated Impulse Responses 
To obtain a better picture of what the model implies about the sources of oil price 
fluctuations, we examine how oil markets respond to a variety of shocks, including an oil 
production shock, an oil reserve shock, U.S. and ROW total factor productivity shocks, U.S. and 
ROW labor–leisure preference shocks, U.S. and ROW oil efficiency shocks, and U.S. and ROW 
investment shocks. We also examine in some detail how various aspects of U.S. activity respond     14 
to oil production and oil reserve shocks. For each series, we report the mean, fifth, and ninety-
fifth percentile of the posterior distribution of the impulse responses.
8  
4.1 Responses of the Oil Market to Structural Shocks 
We find that oil production shocks yield oil-market dynamics that are like the classic 
supply shock envisioned in most economic research. As shown in Figure 1a, a positive oil 
production shock lowers the price of oil and boosts oil output. As the shock dissipates, oil price 
and oil output return toward their steady state values. Similarly, a favorable shock to the 
technology for adding reserves leads to higher oil output and lower oil prices, but these shocks 
take longer to have a substantial effect and have a longer-lived effect on oil prices and oil output. 
 The other eight shocks create what mostly can be described as shifts in oil demand 
(Figures 1a and 1b). A total factor productivity shock in the United States increases the real oil 
price and oil output, reminiscent of an increase in oil demand. An increase in U.S. total factor 
productivity also expands U.S. output and increases the use of oil in production. It also decreases 
the relative scarcity of U.S. goods, pushing down the U.S. GDP deflator which is in the 
denominator of the real oil price variable. 
On the other hand, a total factor productivity shock in ROW leads to a downward 
movement in oil prices and, at least initially, a negative effect on oil output. In part, this effect 
stems from the fact that the U.S. GDP deflator is in the denominator of real oil prices, and a 
ROW total factor productivity shock increases the relative scarcity of U.S. goods, driving up 
their price. Given complete risk sharing across countries and that the ROW accounts for about 65 
percent of world economic activity in the model, all consumers share in the sizable income gains 
as a result of an increase in ROW total factor productivity. Consumers choose to take some of 
their increased productivity in the form of leisure rather than goods, which leads to reduced 
                                                             
8 The impulse responses are the percentage change in each variable for a 1-percent change in the exogenous shock.     15 
consumer use of energy throughout the world. Over time, however, the effect on oil output 
becomes positive, though insignificantly so. 
A shock to U.S. or ROW labor–leisure preferences reduces hours worked and output 
(reducing GDP in the country in which the shock occurs). A U.S. shock initially looks like a 
negative supply shock for oil; weaker economic activity reduces oil consumption and output, but 
the relative price of oil is pushed upward as U.S. firms substitute oil for labor. Over the longer-
term, this substitution drives up the real price of oil and oil output, making the effects look like a 
shift in oil demand. The oil market response to a ROW shock to labor–leisure preferences is 
somewhat different. For a ROW shock, the international income effect dominates, and the shock 
reduces oil demand. Both the real oil price and oil output are reduced. 
An oil efficiency shock increases the productivity of oil (both in production and the 
consumption). Shocks to both U.S. and ROW oil efficiency raise the real oil price and oil output, 
again reminiscent of an oil demand shock. For a shock to ROW oil efficiency, these effects are 
larger but shorter in duration than the effects of U.S. oil efficiency shocks.  
Similarly, both U.S. and ROW investment shocks yield higher real oil prices and oil 
output after the initial period. Such a shock increases the productivity of investment in creating 
capital goods, which gradually increases GDP in the country where such a shock occurs. The 
initial effect for a U.S. investment shock is a slight decline in oil prices—the result of a decline 
in oil demand as the economy redirects resources away from consumption and toward 
investment. For a ROW investment shock, however, the initial effect is no change in oil prices. 
Over the longer term, the gains in investment from either a U.S. or ROW investment shock drive 
up oil demand, and the relative oil price and oil output rise.     16 
 
4.2 Oil Supply Shocks and U.S. Economic Activity 
As modeled, there are two types of oil supply shocks: one that primarily affects current 
oil production and another that primarily affects future oil production. Figure 2 displays the 
responses of the U.S. variables used in estimating the model to these two oil supply shocks. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, a favorable oil production shock initially reduces U.S. GDP. Given the 
estimated value of 0.75 for the preference parameter, γ, and the use of oil in consumption, 
positive oil production shocks reduce the price of oil, which creates substantial positive income 
effects.
9 These income effects yield an initial reduction of U.S. hours worked and U.S. GDP. As 
the effects of the oil production shock begin to dissipate, the income effect is reduced, and U.S. 
hours worked and GDP increase. As expected, both U.S. total consumption and U.S. oil 
consumption increase.  
A favorable shock to the technology for building oil reserves (which also lowers oil 
prices and increases oil output) boosts U.S. GDP, U.S. hours worked, and U.S. oil consumption. 
U.S. total consumption and investment initially fall slightly as resources flow to investment in oil 
reserves.  
Historically, one might consider oil supply shocks to be instances in which oil production 
and oil reserve shocks occurred at the same time. Taken together, the oil production and oil 
reserve shocks generate a negative relationship between oil prices and U.S. economic activity, as 
the model estimates the standard deviation of oil reserve shocks to be roughly twice as large as 
that of oil production shocks. The combination of these two supply shocks implies an estimated 
posterior distribution for the oil price elasticity of U.S. real GDP with a mean of −0.016.
10 The 
                                                             
9 When either γ or oil’s share in consumption are set close to zero, however, the income effect disappears, and U.S. 
hours worked and U.S. GDP strictly increase in response to a positive oil production shock.  
10 The estimated elasticity is the percentage change in U.S. GDP divided by the percentage change in the oil price.     17 
interior 90 percent of the posterior distribution for the elasticity is −0.011 to −0.022. These 
estimates are at the lower end of the range, −0.012 to −0.12, found by previous empirical 
research for the United States.
11 
Other shocks, such as those to U.S. preferences and oil efficiency, can also generate an 
inverse relationship between oil price fluctuations and U.S. output—although both yield a 
positive relationship between oil prices and oil output. Both a U.S. preference shock and oil 
efficiency shock reduce U.S. GDP while increasing the real oil price through increased oil 
demand. In contrast, shocks to U.S. total factor productivity, ROW preferences, ROW oil 
efficiency, and U.S. and ROW investment efficiency generate a positive relationship between oil 
price, oil output, and U.S. GDP. A shock to ROW total factor productivity generates a lower real 
world oil price and lower oil output while having an insignificant negative effect on U.S. GDP. 
5. Historical Decompositions 
  Historical decompositions show the contribution of the various shocks to the evolution of 
oil prices, oil output, and U.S. real GDP. In each figure, we represent the history of the 
demeaned log of the oil price, the detrended log of oil output, or the detrended log of U.S. real 
GDP over the 40-year estimation period, as well as the mean, fifth percentile, and ninety-fifth 
percentile of the posterior distribution of the contribution of the exogenous shocks. The extent to 
which the posterior distribution moves with the historical series shows the extent to which the 
given variable explains the historical movement. 
Impulse responses provide guidance to interpreting the historical decompositions. To 
identify historical episodes of unfavorable oil supply shocks that reduce U.S. GDP, we must 
identify periods during which the oil price rises and both oil output and U.S. GDP fall. On the 
other hand, the identification of oil demand shocks requires oil prices and oil output to move in 
                                                             
11 See Jones et al. (2004).     18 
the same direction. Depending on the nature of the shock creating a change in oil demand, U.S. 
GDP can rise or fall. 
5.1 Real Oil Price and Oil Output 
  As shown in Figure 3, the historical decompositions suggest that both oil supply and oil 
demand shocks contributed to the historical movements of oil prices. Supply shocks (oil 
production and reserve shocks) are characterized by fairly long swings with supply falling in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, rising from the early 1980s to about 2000, and falling thereafter. 
These oil supply changes contributed to the general rise of oil prices from the early 1970s to 
mid-1980s, the general decline in oil prices from the mid-1980s to about 2000, and the rise in 
prices that occurred from 2000 to 2008.  
In contrast, demand shocks (in the form of oil efficiency shocks) contributed much of the 
volatility in oil prices and oil output seen from 1970 through 2009. Other U.S. and ROW shocks 
(total factor productivity, preference and investment shocks) play much lesser roles in the history 
of oil price and oil output movements, explaining only a general rise in oil prices from 1970 to 
the early 1980s. 
Our finding that oil supply shocks do not explain much in the way of oil price movements 
is similar to conclusions reached by Barsky and Kilian (2002) and Kilian (2009). In examining 
the data, we find that over most of the sample period, oil prices and oil output do not move in a 
way that the model or theory would expect if oil supply shocks were important to oil price 
variation. Sharp declines in production do not accompany the sharp oil price increases from the 
1970s into the early 1980s and then the 2000s. The path of least resistance, as far as the model is 
concerned, is to attribute the co-movements in oil prices and oil output to oil-specific demand 
shocks (oil efficiency shocks).      19 
As modeled, an oil efficiency shock is a change in the productivity of oil in consumption 
and the production of capital services. According to the estimation, these oil efficiency shocks do 
not have a strong effect on either consumption or manufacturing output. Hence, oil efficiency 
shocks become an avenue for oil demand shocks that have very little spillover to other economic 
activity, which raises the possibility that oil efficiency shocks proxy other effects, such as 
speculative or precautionary oil demand. 
5.2 U.S. Economic Activity 
  The historical decompositions show that oil supply shocks had very moderate effects on 
U.S. economic activity (Figure 4). Oil supply shocks contributed to a mild slowing of U.S. 
economic activity from the early 1970s to the early 1980s and a mild rise in activity from the 
mid-1980s to late 1990s, but they do not explain the volatility of U.S. economic activity. Given 
that our model shows oil supply shocks have generated only mild, long-term swings in oil prices 
and oil output, it should not be surprising that the effect of such shocks on U.S. GDP was small. 
The historical decompositions also show that ROW shocks are similarly moderate in their 
effects—even in those cases where ROW shocks have contributed to rising oil prices. Although 
the income gains and productivity spillovers to the United States are small, they offset any 
economic losses that arise from the effects of higher oil prices. 
The historical decompositions identify U.S. shocks as being of the greatest importance to 
the evolution of U.S. GDP. With oil efficiency playing almost no role, U.S. preference, total 
factor productivity, and investment shocks show the greatest effects. Together these three effects 
explain much of the volatility in U.S. GDP in early 1970s. Total factor productivity drove a 
sharp decline in the early 1980s, and U.S. preference shocks drove U.S. GDP from the early     20 
1980s through 2009, with investment efficiency also making important contributions to the 
swings.  
5.3 Oil Prices and U.S. Economic Activity in the 1970s to Early 1980s and the 2000s 
We find the relatively poor U.S. economic performance in the mid-1970s through the 
early 1980s largely resulted from shocks to total factor productivity, aided by preference and 
investment efficiency shocks. Oil supply shocks contributed only moderately to the poor 
economic performance, while ROW shocks contributed to the downdraft in the mid-1970s. 
These findings differ sharply from earlier studies, such as those by Hamilton (1983) and Balke et 
al. (2002), who found that oil price shocks had a substantial effect on economic activity without 
distinguishing between sources of oil price shocks or identifying the effect of other shocks on 
U.S. economic activity. In failing to consider these other factors, these earlier studies likely 
attributed too much of the economic loss to oil price shocks. 
  Our findings for the 1970s and early 1980s are somewhat stronger than but consistent 
with those of Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Samaniego (2006), Blanchard and Gali (2007), 
and Kilian (2009). Kilian finds that oil supply shocks are of lesser importance to U.S. GDP than 
other sources of economic fluctuation. In contrast, Blanchard and Gali find the poor U.S. 
economic performance of the 1970s owes to a combination of adverse oil price shocks and other 
negative factors. Greenwood and Yorukoglu and Samaniego attribute some of the negative 
productivity shocks of that era to significant learning costs associated with the adoption of new 
technologies and the necessity of plant-level reorganization.
12 
For the 1990s and 2000s, we find the strong growth in U.S. real GDP (and the subsequent 
recession) reflects several different domestic sources. The principal contribution was an 
                                                             
12 Some negative productivity shocks of the 1970s also may have resulted from the new and relatively inefficient 
environmental regulation introduced during that era.     21 
investment boom that began in the mid-1990s. Gains in total factor productivity followed from 
about 2000 but were dulled as U.S. preferences shifted toward leisure. In the late 2000s, 
investment and preference shocks were the main contributors to the decline in U.S. GDP.
13 
These shocks originating in the United States only had moderate effects on oil prices. Oil 
supply shocks contributed to a general upward rise in oil prices without much effect on U.S. 
GDP. Oil efficiency shocks, both in the United States and ROW, are the major forces behind oil 
price fluctuations. These findings are similar to those of Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Hicks 
(2010), who find that growing world output has pushed oil prices upward. They are somewhat 
different from those by Blanchard and Gali (2007), who find that rising oil prices had small 
negative effects on output, which were generally dwarfed by other positive shocks in the 2000s. 
5.4 Sources of ROW Fluctuations 
Although our focus has been primarily on oil price movements and U.S. economic 
activity, our model does have something to say about fluctuations in the rest of the world. Even 
though the model is quarterly and the ROW data are annual, the model tracks movements in 
ROW GDP (Figure 5). Oil supply and U.S. shocks explain relatively little of the fluctuations in 
ROW GDP. Fluctuations in ROW output fluctuations are driven primarily by ROW shocks, with 
total factor productivity and preferences being the most important. The dramatic gain in ROW 
GDP at the end of the sample can be mostly attributed to increases in ROW total factor 
productivity.  
6. Model Robustness 
  We undertook a number of changes to the model specification to examine the robustness 
of our conclusions. These include re-estimating the model so that the income effects and 
                                                             
13 The lack of a financial sector in the model forces it to attribute the decline in U.S. GDP in 2008–2009 to 
investment and preference shocks.     22 
productivity shocks are constrained to be small, re-estimating the model so that the share of oil in 
consumption is small, replacing investment shocks with “news” shocks for total factor 
productivity in all three countries, and setting the variance of the oil efficiency shocks to be 
small. In all four cases, the resulting historical decompositions show very little change in the 
relationship between oil supply shocks and U.S. GDP. In some cases, the impulse responses and 
other historical decompositions are changed. 
  In keeping with Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), we restrict γ to equal 0.001 so that the 
income effect is small, and re-estimate the model. With this restriction, the response of U.S. 
hours worked and GDP to a positive oil production shock are somewhat different from our base 
case. With the income effect limited, a positive oil production shock increases hours worked and 
U.S. GDP increases. Consequently, oil supply shocks have a larger effect on U.S. GDP (Figure 
6a). Nonetheless, the historical decompositions are largely unaffected by restricting γ to be small. 
  Similarly, we set oil’s share in consumption to be 0.001 and re-estimate the model. 
Again, the response of U.S. hours and GDP to a positive oil production shock is positive (Figure 
6b). Dropping oil out of consumption lessens the income effect of an oil supply shock, and the 
substitution effects dominate. Once again, the historical decompositions are largely unaffected. 
We also replaced investment shocks with a “news” shock about future total factor 
productivity shocks for all three countries. The estimated parameters and historical 
decompositions are largely unchanged. The estimated posterior distribution for γ suggests a 
substantial income effect, and, as a result, favorable news about future oil production results in a 
decrease in current hours and production (both in manufacturing and oil-producing countries). 
Again, historical decompositions suggest oil efficiency shocks are largely responsible for oil     23 
price fluctuations and that neither oil supply shocks nor oil efficiency shocks have much effect 
on U.S. GDP. 
Because our benchmark model finds oil efficiency shocks to be responsible for most of 
the fluctuations in oil prices and oil output, we examined the role of such shocks by setting their 
variance to be small.
14 When oil efficiency shocks have small variances, the historical 
decompositions show that supply shocks drive most of the fluctuations in oil prices, but oil 
output is still largely driven by demand shocks—including those to oil efficiency, total factor 
productivity, preferences, and investment (Figure 7). These findings are consistent with the idea 
that episodic rises in oil prices bear relatively little relationship with falling oil output. In this 
specification, the elasticities of substitution between oil and goods and oil and capital are 
estimated to be very small; oil demand is extremely inelastic. As a result, the model attributes oil 
price movements to oil supply shocks and oil output movements to oil demand shocks. As with 
the other cases, the effect of oil supply shocks on U.S. GDP is unimpressive. 
7. Conclusions 
  Economic history has provided seemingly contradictory evidence about the relationship 
between oil price movements and aggregate U.S. economic activity. Oil prices rose sharply in 
the 1970s and early 1980s, and U.S. economic activity contracted sharply. Oil prices rose 
strongly throughout much of the 2000s, but U.S. economic activity continued to expand until 
recession hit in early 2008. 
Previous research has offered a number of different reasons for these contradictory 
historical experiences. One explanation is that the 2000s were characterized by productivity-
driven oil demand shocks that yielded a positive relationship between oil prices and economic 
                                                             
14 Formally, we assume a tight prior distribution for these standard deviations. We set the model of the prior 
distributions to be 0.001.     24 
activity, while the 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by oil supply shocks that yielded an 
inverse relationship between oil prices and economic activity. Another is that substantially 
different factors shape the movements in oil prices and U.S. GDP, and those factors combine 
differently over time, creating the appearances of an inverse relationship in the earlier period and 
a positive relationship in the latter period. 
We find evidence supporting both explanations, but with much greater weight on the 
latter. Oil supply and oil efficiency shocks have been the primary drivers oil prices, but such 
shocks have had relatively little effect on U.S. GDP. Total factor productivity, preference, and 
investment efficiency shocks have been the primary drivers of fluctuations in U.S. GDP, but 
these shocks have had relatively small effects on oil prices. Nonetheless, we find that oil supply 
shocks contributed a drag to U.S. economic activity in the 1970s and early 1980s. We also find 
that oil demand shocks played a somewhat bigger role in the oil price increases of the 2000s than 
those of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
U.S. GDP fell sharply after the oil price increases in the 1970s and early 1980s, primarily 
because shocks to U.S. productivity reduced output. Oil supply shocks mildly reinforced that 
economic weakness. By not taking into account the possibility of domestic shocks, some of the 
earlier literature likely overestimates the effects that oil supply shocks had on economic activity. 
U.S. GDP continued to rise as oil prices rose in the 2000s because changes in U.S. investment 
efficiency, total factor productivity, and preferences completely overwhelmed the extremely mild 
drag contributed by oil supply shocks.     25 
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Table 1. Prior and Posterior Distributions of Structural Parameters 
 
 
  Prior distribution  Posterior distribution 
Parameter  Type  Mode  5
th 
percentile 
95
th 
percentile  Mode  Mean  5
th 
percentile 
95
th 
percentile 
Discount factor (β)  Beta  0.99  0.989  0.991  0.991  0.991  0.990  0.991 
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution  Gamma  0.5  0.159  1.223  0.571   0.597   0.480   0.748 
Elasticity of substitution, home and 
foreign   Gamma  1.5  0.239  4.336  0.273   0.277   0.229   0.331 
Share of foreign goods in investment   Beta  0.400  0.372  0.428  0.389   0.387   0.360   0.414 
Share of foreign goods in consumption  Beta  0.060  0.051  0.070  0.056   0.057   0.048   0.066 
Static elasticity of labor supply   Gamma
*  2.5  1.528  12.722  2.602   2.623   2.346   2.902 
Labor’s share in time  Beta  0.2  0.175  0.228  0.200   0.200   0.174   0.227 
γ (in utility)  Uniform  0.5  0.050  0.950  0.704   0.752   0.563   0.948 
Labor’s share in manufacturing 
countries’ GDP   Beta  0.64  0.619  0.661  0.618   0.619   0.598   0.640 
Depreciation rate on capital   Beta  0.025  0.029  0.031  0.016   0.016   0.013   0.019 
Capital adjustment cost in 
manufacturing countries   Gamma  0.05  0.025  0.993  1.503   1.547   1.188  1.960  
Elasticity of substitution between goods 
and oil in consumption  Gamma  0.09  0.032  0.458  0.507   0.500   0.409   0.601 
Elasticity of substitution between capital 
and oil in production  Gamma  0.09  0.032  0.458  0.088   0.089   0.076   0.104 
Oil’s share in production  Beta  0.06  0.051  0.070  0.055   0.053843   0.047728   0.060354 
Oil’s share in consumption  Beta  0.04  0.034  0.047  0.0097   0.0098   0.0085   0.0113 
Elasticity of substitution between labor 
and reserves in oil production  Gamma  0.10  0.047  0.247  0.198   0.199   0.104   0.320 
€ 
po /px  Gamma
**  6  3.167  15.067  3.774   4.033   2.991   5.456 
€ 
Yo /X   Beta  0.0065  0.0046  0.0095  0.0048   0.0047   0.0032   0.0065 
Reserve adjustment cost   Gamma  0.05  0.025  0.993  0.054  0.067   0.033  0.112  
 
                                                             
* The prior distribution of x-1 is a gamma distribution. 
** The prior distribution for 
€ 
po /px- 1 is a gamma distribution.     30 
 
 
 
Table 2. Prior and Posterior Distributions of Parameters of Exogenous Driving Forces 
 
 
  Prior distribution  Posterior distribution 
AR(1) coefficient  Type  Mode  5
th 
percentile 
95
th 
percentile  Mode  Mean  5
th 
percentile 
95
th 
percentile 
U.S. total factor productivity (TFP)  Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.981   0.976   0.954   0.991 
Rest-of-world (ROW) TFP  Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.996   0.996   0.991   0.999 
Spillover in TFP  Normal  0.088  0.006  0.170  -0.007   -0.006   -0.011   -0.000 
Oil production shock  Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.941  0.957  0.911  0.993 
Oil reserve shock  Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.978   0.978   0.960   0.993 
U.S. preference shock  Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.976   0.982   0.957   0.998 
ROW preference shock  Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.997   0.996   0.989   0.999 
U.S. oil efficiency shock  Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.966   0.979   0.941   0.999 
ROW oil efficiency shock  Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.837   0.845   0.797   0.891 
U.S. investment shock  Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.957   0.945   0.907   0.973 
ROW investment shock   Beta  0.90  0.311  0.968  0.976   0.971   0.939   0.992 
 
Standard deviation of innovations                 
U.S. total factor productivity  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  0.690   0.686   0.620  0.758 
ROW total factor productivity  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  0.624   0.646   0.569   0.734 
Corr(U.S. TFP, ROW TFP)  Beta
*  0.258  -0.240  0.630  0.541   0.515   0.391   0.627 
Oil production shock  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  2.148   2.178   1.972   2.413 
Oil reserve shock  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  4.021   4.969   3.334   7.266 
U.S. preference shock  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  0.503  0.528   0.442   0.628 
ROW preference shock  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  0.669   0.724   0.562   0.916 
U.S. oil efficiency shock  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  30.761   31.200   27.177   35.705 
ROW oil efficiency shock  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  38.662   38.860   33.737   44.445 
U.S. investment shock  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  12.911   12.635   9.684   16.105 
ROW investment shock  Gamma  0.10  0.172  9.180  3.126   3.323   2.271   4.899 
                                                             
* The prior distribution for (Corr(US TFP,ROW TFP)+1)/2 is a beta distribution. Corr=Correlation. 0 20 40 60
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Figure 2.  Response of U.S. Variables to Oil Supply Shocks1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
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Figure 3.  Historical Decomposition of Real Oil Price and Oil Output1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
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Figure 4.  Historical Decomposition of U.S. GDP1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
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Figure 6a.  Response of U.S. Variables to Oil Shocks:
Model with Restricted Preferences, gamma = 0.001
Figure 6b.  Response of U.S. Variables to Oil Shocks:
Model with Small Oil Share in Consumption1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
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Figure 7:  Historical Decomposition of Real Oil Price and Oil Output:
Model with Small Oil Efficiency Shocks 
Technical Appendix 
 
A. Observation Equations in the State-Space Model 
Our data consists of observations on U.S. GDP, consumption, investment, and 
employment, the relative (non-oil) import price for the United States, U.S. oil consumption 
(barrels), real oil price (deflated by U.S. GDP deflator), world oil production (barrels), rest-of-
world (ROW) real GDP in U.S. dollars as measured by purchasing power parity (PPP), and 
ROW real investment in U.S. dollars as measured by PPP. For several variables, the mapping 
between the model and the data are exact: 
€ 
ˆ  Y  us,t
cons = ˆ  C  a,t, 
€ 
ˆ  Y  us,t
inv = ˆ  I  a,t, 
€ 
ˆ  Y  ROW,t
inv = ˆ  I  b,t, 
€ 
ˆ  Y  us,t
emp = ˆ  N  a,t, 
€ 
ˆ  Y  oil output,t = ˆ  Y  o,t, and 
€ 
ˆ  Y  us,t
oil cons = ˆ  O  a,t. However, several variables need to be transformed to 
correspond to the data we will employ. Output in the model corresponds to gross output rather 
than value added, thus GDP is given by 
€ 
ˆ  Y  row,t
gdp = (ˆ  Y  b,t −
PoOb
PbYa
ˆ  O  b,t)/(1−
PoOb
PbYb
) and 
€ 
ˆ  Y  us,t
gdp = (ˆ  Y  a,t −
PoOa
PaYa
ˆ  O  a,t)/(1−
PoOa
PaYa
). Similarly, as the GDP (value added) deflator was used to 
deflate the import price and oil price, 
€ 
ˆ  Y  us,t
rel import price = ( ˆ  P  b,t − ˆ  P  a,t)+ ( ˆ  P  o,t − ˆ  P  a,t)
PoOa
PaYa
1−
PoOa
PaYa
, and 
€ 
ˆ  Y  real oil price,t = ( ˆ  P  o,t − ˆ  P  a,t)/(1−
PoOa
PaYa
). 
 
B. Bayesian Estimation of the DSGE Model 
  One can write the solution to the linearized, rational expectations dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) model in terms of a state-space model:     40 
 
€ 
Yt
mod el = ΠSt
mod el,          (B1) 
 
€ 
St = MSt−1 +Vt
mod el,          (B2) 
where 
€ 
Yt
mod el
 is a vector of endogenous variables in the model; 
€ 
St
mod el is the state vector that 
includes the capital stocks of the United States (country a) and ROW (country b), oil reserves, 
and the ten exogenous shock variables: oil production shocks; oil reserve shocks; and total factor 
productivity, labor–leisure preferences, oil efficiency, and investment (capital accumulation) 
shocks for countries a and b. 
The model is written in terms of quarters, but we have only annual data for ROW GDP 
and ROW investment. Thus, we partition the observation equation of the state-space model into 
two sets of equations—one corresponding to quarterly observations, the other corresponding to 
annual observations. The observation equation is given by: 
€ 
Yt
obs =
Yt
quarterly
Yt
annual
 
 
 
 
 
 =
Π1 0 0 0
.25Π2 .25Π2 .25Π2 .25Π2
 
 
 
 
 
 
St
mod el
St−1
mod el
St−2
mod el
St−3
mod el
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.    (B3) 
The corresponding state equation is given by: 
€ 
St
mod el
St−1
mod el
St−2
mod el
St−3
mod el
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
M 0 0 0
I 0 0 0
0 I 0 0
0 0 I 0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
St−1
mod el
St−2
mod el
St−3
mod el
St−4
mod el
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+
Vt
mod el
0
0
0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.      (B4) 
The empirical state space model implied by (B3) and (B4) can be rewritten as: 
 
€ 
Yt
obs = H(θ)St +Wt,Wt ~ MVN(0,R),        (B5) 
 
€ 
St = F(θ)St−1 +Vt,Vt ~ MVN(0,Q(θ)),       (B6) 
where   is the vector of observable time series,  is the vector of unobserved state variables, 
and   is the vector of structural parameters in the DSGE model. In our application,   contains     41 
detrended quarterly per capita real U.S. GDP, detrended quarterly per capita real U.S. 
consumption, detrended quarterly per capita real U.S. investment, detrended per capita quarterly 
U.S. oil consumption, detrended quarterly world oil production, demeaned quarterly real oil 
price, detrended quarterly real non-oil import price for the United States, detrended annual real 
GDP for ROW (PPP constant U.S. dollars), and detrended annual real investment expenditures 
for ROW (PPP constant U.S. dollars). We scale up all the variables by 100. We set   to be a 
diagonal matrix with diagonal elements equal to
€ 
10
−4. We treat observations for the annual data 
as missing for all but the fourth quarter of the year.  
   Given the parameters, , we can estimate the unobserved states by the Kalman Filter. The 
predictive log likelihood of the state space model is given by: 
 
€ 
l(Y T,θ) = {−.5log(det(H(θ)'Pt|t−1H(θ)+ R))
t=1
T
∑
−.5(Yt − H(θ)St|t−1)'(H(θ)'Pt|t−1H(θ)+ R)
−1(Yt − H(θ)St|t−1)},
     (B7) 
where 
€ 
St|t−1 and   are the conditional mean and variance of  from the Kalman filter.  
  Given a prior distribution over parameters, 
€ 
h(θ), the posterior distribution, 
€ 
P(θ |YT) , is  
€ 
P(θ |YT) ∝ exp(l(YT,θ))h(θ).          (B8) 
Because the log-likelihood is a highly nonlinear function of the structural parameter vector, it is 
not possible to write an analytical expression for the posterior distribution. As a result, we use 
Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods to estimate the posterior distribution of the 
parameter vector,  . In particular, we employ a Metropolis-Hasting sampler to generate draws 
from the posterior distributions. The algorithm is as follows: 
(i)  Given a previous draw of the parameter vector, 
€ 
θ
(i−1), draw a candidate vector   
from the distribution 
€ 
g(θ |θ
(i−1)).      42 
(ii)  Determine the acceptance probability for the candidate draw,  
€ 
α(θ
c,θ
(i−1)) = min
exp(l(YT,θ
(c)))h(θ
(c))
exp(l(YT,θ
(i−1)))h(θ
(i−1))
g(θ
(i−1) |θ
c)
g(θ
c |θ
(i−1))
,1
 
 
 
 
 
 . 
(iii)  Determine a new draw from the posterior distribution, 
€ 
θ
(i). 
€ 
θ
(i) =θ
c with probability 
€ 
α(θ
c,θ
(i−1)) , 
€ 
θ
(i) =θ
(i−1) with probability 
€ 
1−α(θ
c,θ
(i−1)) . 
(iv)  Return to (i). 
 Starting from an initial parameter vector and repeating enough times, the distribution parameters 
draws, 
€ 
θ
(i), will converge to the true posterior distribution.  
In our application, 
€ 
θ
c =θ
(i−1) + v, where 
€ 
v is drawn from a multivariate t-distribution with 
50 degrees of freedom and a covariance matrix . We set   to be a scaled value of the Hessian 
matrix of 
€ 
− l(YT,θ))−ln(h(θ)) evaluated at the posterior mode. We choose the scaling so that 
around 50 percent of the candidate draws are accepted. We run five separate Markov Chains, 
each with a different initial condition. For each chain, we set a burn-up period of 100,000 draws 
and then sample every tenth draw for a total of 10,000 draws. Thus, the posterior distribution of 
parameters is based on a total of 100,000 draws. We also obtain the posterior distributions for the 
unobserved states. Given a parameter draw, we draw from the conditional posterior distribution 
for the unobserved states, 
€ 
P(ST |Θ
(i),YT). Here we use the “filter forward, sample backwards” 
approach proposed by Carter and Kohn (1994) and discussed in Kim and Nelson (1999).  
 
C. Data Sources for ROW 
To obtain an approximate estimate of the data for the rest-of-world oil-consuming 
country, ROW, we aggregate data from 29 countries—Brazil, China, and India, plus 26 of the 30 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. We exclude the     43 
United States, whose data is used for the home country in the model; Mexico, which is a major 
oil-producing country; and the Czech Republic and Slovakia, neither of which have reliable data 
prior to 1990. Because real GDP and investment are reported in U.S. dollars, we aggregate these 
series across countries. We convert ROW GDP and investment to per capita series by dividing 
with population aggregated across countries.  
For the period 1970 to 2003, the data for population, real GDP, and real investment for 
all 29 countries are taken from the Penn World Table. For the period 2004 through 2008, the data 
for the 26 OECD countries are from the OECD; and the data for Brazil, India, and China are 
from Haver Analytics. The data from 2004 to 2008 were spliced to the earlier data in 2003, 
country by country, and then aggregated to obtain per capita measures of ROW output and 
investment. 
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